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The site of the incident on the Meizhou-Dabu Expressway. Photographer unknown.

09:15 pm | July 22, 2024

Those Who Have Disappeared (Again): Emergency Response in China

Highly exposed to severe disasters, China intertwines its emergency relief approach with maintaining political stability and social control.

By He Man

 Quick Takes:

  • From 1949 to 1978, disaster governance in China prioritized politics: the government controlled everything, rejected international aid, and tightly controlled information, resulting in unknown death tolls in many disasters.
  • After 1978, disaster management shifted towards a multi-stakeholder model, and citizens' engagement emerged following the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake.
  • Since 2013, disaster governance has become part of the national security regime, with increased centralization; the party leads emergency response directly while the government conducts implementation.
  • NGOs are incorporated under associations or as government-purchased services, with strengthened party control, reducing their independence and ability to respond to disasters.
  • Journalists can hardly report on disasters, and even central media outlets face increasing censorship and harassment, leading to a decline in transparency, public trust, and societal resilience. 

A section of the Meizhou-Dabu Expressway in Guangdong Province collapsed without warning on 1 May 2024. 23 cars rolled down a slope off the highway, with many of them exploding or catching fire. At least 48 died and 30 were injured. Guangdong experienced extreme rainfall in the days leading up to the tragedy. However, it is uncertain whether human factors played a role in the incident, as the public has been unable to access any information on this matter. As law professor Lao Dongyan from Tsinghua University commented on Weibo, a popular social media platform: “Public incidents are getting increasingly difficult to get to the bottom of. We don’t hear about major incidents anymore. Guangdong had just had a whole month of extreme rainfall. Beyond the natural factors, though, the human factor at play with this tragedy has not been investigated. The victims have disappeared from the public sphere.” To this day, the identities of the deceased have not been disclosed.

An article published by Sanlian Life Weekly on May 6, which interviewed individuals connected to the incident, was removed from the internet just two hours after its release. A subsequent article by Caixin, published on May 10, interviewed survivors and construction experts anonymously and raised doubts about the quality of construction of the expressway, which was built during a 2014-2015 infrastructure boom. Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs) were frequently used to finance such projects. Meizhou's deputy mayor, who was in charge of the transportation portfolio, was arrested for corruption and bribery in 2023. The Caixin exposé, too, was quickly taken off the internet. 

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A 404 error message from the Caixin website stating that the page does not exist or has been deleted.

In recent years, China’s approach to disaster management has been “keeping political stability.” In the aftermath of an incident, local authorities quickly dispatch police to seal off the affected area, only allowing access by government-approved media, and “physically isolate” the victims’ families by asking them to stay in hotels and avoid contact with journalists. A rare “free window” after the Meizhou-Dabu Expressway disaster was enough for the Sanlian Life Weekly journalist to find out about the victims from online platforms. Nevertheless, the news article disappeared shortly after the incident, and the victims’ names vanished again, making it impossible to establish a support network involving social organizations and the public. 

Disaster relief has been closely linked to political power in China since ancient times, ranging from the legend of “Dayu controlling the floods” to the constant emphasis put on how well the national system ostensibly works in the current era. The narrative focuses on disaster-related achievements toshowcase the capacity of those in power and boost their legitimacy, whereas individuals affected by the disaster are largely ignored.

In recent decades, the relationship between China’s party-state and society has undergone dynamic changes, with increased enthusiasm toward the involvement of civil society in disaster relief and public welfare. However, control strategies, adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, have once again shown the government’s controlling nature and desire to keep a lid on the public sphere overall. By exploring China’s political context, from the perspective of emergency response, we can get a glimpse of how the power structure has shifted and how autonomous civic participation in public welfare efforts has been nipped in the bud. In this article, I will explore post-1949 changes in the emergency management system, the differences in the government's intention behind disaster relief in different periods, and the resulting social impacts.

1949-1978“Unified” Management

After 1949, China was governed by a unified management model in which the government exercised control over all aspects of life. Emergency rescue work can be characterized by “foregrounding politics, with the Party and the Government taking over everything and mobilizing the masses to help themselves and rejecting international assistance.” The social space for non-governmental organizations was stifled by an approach that placed the Party at the center of everything: traditional private charities such as Shantang benevolent associations were all banned or transformed. The few remaining social organizations operated as extensions of the Party.

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Poster No. 9 from the series "People's communes are good", 1960. The Chinese characters read: "The power to fight disasters is strong to quicker raise the levels of production and life." Image from www.chineseposters.net.

This approach to managing crises prioritized strict information control, as evidenced by the Great Famine (1959-1961): by the end of 1960, large numbers of people had starved to death in rural China, causing the population to fall by 10 million in just a year. A People’s Daily headline on 29 December, on the other hand, claimed that “China’s Agricultural Production Suffered a Severe Natural Disaster in 1960, and 600 million People Overcame, with Full Confidence, the Serious Difficulties” without the article mentioning any death toll at all.   

Similarly, on January 5, 1970, after a 7.7 magnitude earthquake in Tonghai, Yunnan province, the only disaster report published in the People’s Daily provided no information about the magnitude or casualty count. The earthquake zone was even euphemized as an area south of the provincial capital, Kunming. Relief sent to the quake zone included hundreds of thousands of copies of The Quotations of Chairman Mao and Chairman Mao badges. Journalists were denied access, only photography by scientific workers was permitted, but only objects were allowed to be photographed, not people. These rules were also applied in the wake of the 1976 Tangshan earthquake. It was not until the thirtieth anniversary of the Tonghai earthquake that the casualty count was released: 15,801 deaths.

In 1975, a devastating rainstorm in Zhumadian, Henan province, resulted in the bursting of two large reservoirs and numerous smaller ones. The ensuing flood caused a death toll exceeding 26,000. The exact death toll from this flood is unknown and should include deaths from infectious diseases and famine directly caused by it. Some studies have called this “by far the world’s worst dam disaster” “As many as 230,000 people may have lost their lives to this catastrophe, yet for two decades it was successfully airbrushed from history by the Chinese authorities.”

As mentioned above, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Tangshan in Hebei province on 28 July 1976. The recorded death toll was the highest for any earthquake ever (over 240,000 in the official reckoning), but Chinese media did not directly report on the disaster, and no victims were mentioned. The next day, the People's Daily merely stated that “the great leader Chairman Man and the Party Central Committee were extremely concerned, and sent their condolences, whereas the people of the quake zone, under the guidance of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary ideology, had successfully upheld the revolutionary motto “Man can Conquer Nature” in their disaster-relief efforts. Other commentaries in the paper emphasized “self-reliant disaster relief” to reflect the “great superiority of the socialist system of proletarian dictatorship.” China rejected international assistance from the UN and the international community. The death toll of the Tangshan earthquake was made public only three years later, and journalist Qian Gang was only able to publish his famous book Tangshan Earthquake ten years down the road, a book he states is about “people’s deaths, the human tragedy, what people experienced during the earthquake.”

1978 – 2003: A Multi-stakeholder Model

Following the 'Reform and Opening-Up' period initiated in 1978, the Ministry of Civil Affairs was established to oversee social administration, including a dedicated Rural Social Relief Department to coordinate disaster relief efforts in rural China. Central specialized agencies such as the National Disaster Reduction Committee and the State Council Earthquake Relief Headquarters were also set up.

Since 1980, China has officially accepted assistance from what is now the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In May 1987, Government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) such as the Chinese Red Cross and the China Youth Development Foundation began to play a role in emergency response and assistance. When a major forest fire broke out in the Greater Khingan region of Heilongjiang province, multiple Chinese ministries and commissions coordinated foreign aid by setting up a working group. The first time China proactively requested international assistance.

The arrival of international NGOs in China also led to a revival of Chinese non-governmental organizations’ role. The 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China explicitly provided for citizens’ freedom of association. In September 1988, the first administrative regulations specifically about registration and management of Chinese non-governmental organizations, the Administrative Measures for Foundations were issued. The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women was held on 1 September 1995 in Beijing; the concept of the NGO entered Chinese public discourse, and certain parts of civil society started to become active.   

In 1996, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a Notice on Giving Full Play to the Role of Charitable Organizations in Social Relief Work, stating that charitable organizations were “a bridge between the government and the people. They have specific strengths when mobilizing social resources and implementing poverty alleviation and relief and play an important role.”

Two more documents were issued in 1998: the Regulations on Registration and Administration of Social Groups and the Interim Regulations on Registration and Administration of Private Non-Enterprise Units. These set a basis for registering non-governmental and non-profit service organizations in social welfare, education, health, and the environment. In June 1999, the Law on the Donations for Public Welfare was passed, the country’s first law on charitable donations. 

Political reform led to numerous changes in the news media in the 1980s. Journalist Qian Gang argues that breakthroughs occurred with disaster reporting becoming more human and calling for reflection. But in the 1990s, the trend reversed. No reporting was initially allowed on the 1998 floods, and even later journalists who covered them were subjected to critiques. When SARS broke out in 2003, the official reaction was suppression and concealment of the news, but eventually, the dam burst, and reports began to surface. The official tone later turned towards heavy reporting of the anti-SARS measures.

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Book cover of Tangshan Earthquake, and author Qian Gang. Photo provided by Qian Gang.

Nevertheless, the same period saw strong enthusiasm for charitable donations. A 2003 notice from the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation stated, “In the case of epidemic prevention donations in cash from social entities such as enterprises and individuals, these may be fully deducted for income tax purposes.” This was China’s first tax break in response to a sudden public health incident. Donations eventually reached almost 4 billion yuan.

2003 -2013: The Politics of Compassion

From SARS in 2003 to 2013, the government adopted a “comprehensive coordination” approach to emergency management. The 2003 State Council institutional reform plan tasked the Ministry of Civil Affairs with coordinating and organizing national disaster relief operations, including verification, resource allocation, and coordinating donations. In 2006, an Emergency Management Office was established within the State Council General Office to improve collaboration between local governments and various departments in the State Council. Additionally, an Emergency Response Law was passed in 2007, dividing emergencies into four categories: natural disasters, accidental disasters, public health incidents, and public safety incidents.

The 2008 Sichuan Earthquake marked a breakthrough in disaster reporting. Media outlets, all over the country, immediately dispatched reporters, and tragic scenes from the quake zone were instantly relayed online and on TV. In Qian Gang’s view, what was different this time was the focus on truthfulness and the tragic nature of the disaster, as well as more human reporting – compared to the 1990s’ approach, this formed a "U-shaped" return to the reform spirit in the 1980s. When Premier Wen Jiabao toured the quake zone, the voices of local people crying out were not edited out of media coverage. There were initially numerous media reports of school building collapses (this topic was later censored).

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A Korean rescue team working at the Sichuan Earthquake scene on May 17, 2008. Photo taken by Seoul Metropolitan Fire & Disaster Headquarters. Image available at Wikimedia Commons.

The Wenchuan tragedy triggered a significant shift in disaster relief and brought all forces in China together. The Chinese government broadly welcomed foreign aid from governments and NGOs. This multi-channel fundraising enabled weak links to be fortified, especially in areas where central and local government disaster relief was ineffective.

One of the most remarkable phenomena in the wake of the earthquake was the outpouring of civic engagement: countless citizens volunteered, some traveling long distances to assist survivors, rebuild communities, commemorate the fallen, and demand accountability. This massive wave, estimated at millions of people, transcended state control. Citizens are organized through NGOs, grassroots groups, and small networks, bypassing traditional mobilization structures. The resulting surge of public action, motivated by a desire to do good for society, evolved the earthquake from a pure disaster into a new politics of citizen-level compassion.

Notably, the organization One Foundation, focusing on emergency response, has gradually become an open platform for NGOs to work together. “One Foundation Joint Disaster Relief,” was co-initiated by NGOs from four Southwestern provinces in 2011. As of August 2014, the coalition includes over 300 NGOs with members from 15 provinces. 

After the 2013 Ya’an earthquake in Sichuan, NGOs increasingly focused on resource pooling, information sharing, and acting together. Local governments also appointed quake zone coordinators for NGO rescue efforts; they were also responsible for prompt disaster information sharing. 219 foundations participated in the Ya’an earthquake emergency rescue and post-disaster reconstruction. The involvement of private and public welfare and charity organizations in disaster relief was considered a sign of a nascent joint emergency mechanism for various non-government entities to get disaster relief in an orderly, effective, professional, sustainable, equal, and mutually supportive way.

Post-2013: Emergency Management under the ‘Overall Security Concept’ 

When Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping took office, he warned that China now faces the most complicated situation, internally and externally. He outlined the Overall National Security Outlook as a new strategy to protect the nation, according to China Daily in 2014. This concept ensures that the national security work of all departments and domains can maintain efficient operation by focusing on safeguarding the core interests and other major interests of the state. As observers analyzed, the reform and expansion of the national security regime reflect the Communist Party leadership's deep anxiety about facing dual pressures and their desire to centralize and improve national security decision-making.

Before this, national security primarily involved the responsibilities of departments such as defense, diplomacy, national security, and intelligence and was separate from domestic social security issues. The new strategy made "National Security" an extensive term, encompassing an integrated system that includes political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, social, scientific, information, ecological, resource, and nuclear security, among others. Under this umbrella, social governance, including emergency management, is now considered part of national security.Under this umbrella, social governance, including emergency management, is included within national security. Official readouts of the 19th (2017) and 20th (2022) Central Committee meetings of the Party emphasized improved disaster prevention, reduction, and response capacities as part of the “public security system” and defined the essence of emergency management as “public security governance.”

In 2018, the Ministry of Emergency Management (MEM) was established, consolidating various ministries and agencies’ responsibilities for natural disasters and incidents under one roof (public health accidents still fall under the National Health Commission, and the Party’s Political and Legal Affairs deals with social stability). The new ministry is positioned as a political organ. In March 2020, the Party Cell of the MEM was renamed the Party Committee, further strengthening its hold over emergency management work. Ministry Party Secretary Huang Ming stated that the MEM will “resolutely implement the concept of overall national security,” with the priority being “always adhering to the absolute leadership of the Party over emergency management work, and build a loyal, responsible and reliable emergency management team.” In other words, the government departments’ coordination of the emergency response has ended. The party takes a direct lead now. The same holds true in public health: after the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan in 2020, the Party Central Committee established a pandemic response work group, whereas the government’s main role was to implement the decisions and arrangements of the Party.

After the establishment of the MEM, various social entities involved in disaster response have been brought under the government’s aegis employing norms, standards, training, and assessment. The Opinions on Further Promoting the Healthy Development of Social Emergency Forces issued in 2022 by the MEM and four other ministries set the goal of “establishing a grid-based, institutionalized, organizational system with a focus on the community of within the next three to five years.” The Opinions also emphasized the need to “strengthen and resolutely implement the ideological position” of civilian rescue teams, “continuously enhance the political and organizational functions of party organizations to ensure the right direction of development,” and “continuously strengthen the sense of responsibility to Party, country, and people.”

In 2023, the Party established the Social Work Department of the Central Comittee, responsible for directing the party work of numerous groups, including private businesses and social organizations. For instance, the China Association for Disaster Prevention, a social organization, has its party-building work managed by the Central Social Work Department, while its business operations are regulated by the MEM, and its registration is handled by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The association currently has 24 branches and nearly 1000 corporate members. A sub-entity, the Emergency Rescue Services Branch, brings together the most influential private rescue organizations.

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Emergency response has thus been comprehensively redesigned. Civilian rescue teams are reorganized and incorporated under associations or in the form of government-purchased services. The management of these associations is strengthened with party control, resulting in a decrease in the independence of NGOs; thus, there is no room for scrutiny or accountability.

Control over the media has also considerably increased over the past decade. Journalists find it increasingly challenging to report on critical stories. After the Party Central Committee issued the Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Integration of Traditional and New Media in 2014, the term, "media integration" became synonymous with the new approach, which aims to mainstream official ideology in the new media landscape. During the news and public opinion work symposium in 2016, President Xi emphasized that "media sponsored by the Party and the government are the propaganda fronts of the Party and the government, and therefore must be named after the Party."

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Screenshot of journalist He Guangwei’s Weibo post criticizing Zhengzhou’s 50 billion-plus yuan sponge city policy.

 

In 2015, after a passenger ferry capsized in the Yangtze River, resulting in the deaths of 442 people, a Southern Metropolis Daily team wrote a 10,000-character investigative report on the causes of the disaster. However, the report was blocked from publication. Consequently, most Chinese investigative journalists left their jobs in the following years.

A major flood in Zhengzhou on 20 July 2021, killed at least 300 people, including 14 who were trapped in a subway train in a flooded tunnel. Despite the severity of the disaster, official media adhered strictly to the prescribed reporting line. The Zhengzhou Party Committee’s official Weibo account even bizarrely claimed that “the city would become cleaner after the historically unforeseen heavy rain, with grass and trees appearing even more pristine.” Simultaneously, online media faced increased control and censorship. Reporter He Guangwei’s critique of Zhengzhou’s 50 billion-plus yuan “sponge city” policy on Weibo was swiftly silenced.

Hostility to foreign media was particularly evident in coverage of the floods, with the Henan province Communist Youth League even calling on people via Weibo to be wary of foreign media. In a disturbing incident, a German TV reporter and a Los Angeles Times journalist were mobbed in Zhengzhou, their cameras and shirts held hostage by the crowd. The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China complained of death threats and message and telephone harassment of the BBC and Los Angeles Times in the wake.

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Screenshot of the Information on People Who Need to Be Rescued" file

Even in the face of adversity, many people demonstrated their civic engagement by harnessing online tools for collaboration and mutual aid during the 2021 Zhengzhou flood. A university student from Shanghai utilized Tencent Docs, an online platform for multi-user document editing, to create an "Information on People Who Need to Be Rescued" file. Urgent requests poured in, from a pregnant woman needing an ambulance to individuals trapped in the subway. Volunteers verified the information and facilitated rescues, while spreadsheets were created to organize rescue teams and provide aid. Libraries stayed open all night, science museums provided instant noodles, and clubs supplied diving equipment. Programmers even developed applets for precise map locations. The document garnered over 6.5 million views within days, becoming a multifunctional non-governmental flood control and resource platform. This highlighted the creative spirit and passion for rescue at the grassroots level.

However, the overall trend development shows less and less space for Chinese civilians to participate in disaster response. When extreme rainstorms ravaged North China in 2023, various grassroots rescue teams rushed to the severely affected city of Zhuozhou, Hebei. Yet they were barred due to a bureaucratic requirement—an elusive “invitation letter.” According to a Southern Weekend report, regulations said that any cross-province civilian rescue team should first apply to the emergency management department of the locality in question. However, the basis of this system is unclear and there is no legal basis for it, as it goes against the humanitarian ideals that rescue work is supposed to serve.  Amid the disaster, bureaucracy became an impassable obstacle. The Zhuozhou Emergency Management Bureau’s line reportedly had lost electric power due to the floods, and the Bureau’s “chop”(official seal) was “in another building – staff is currently being sent to retrieve it but there is deep water to be crossed in between.” This “official seal” episode shows how centralized the disaster relief system now is; its excessively hierarchical nature easily leads to paralysis if anything goes wrong at the ‘center’ during a disaster. 

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Screenshot of an invitation letter issued from the Zhuozhou Emergency Management Bureau, Hebei.

Is history repeating itself?

The rigidity of China’s emergency management system mirrors a broader decline in societal resilience. Xiang Biao, director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Germany, points out that China’s pandemic control approach over three years has exposed a lack of public trust in the government and a weakening public spirit in Chinese society: “If society had a slightly stronger public nature, flawed policies wouldn’t be able to get implemented that well. At the very least, even if the policy couldn’t be changed, civilian resilience and mutual aid would be a bit stronger.”

However, recent developments in disaster relief reveal a different trajectory. The establishment of the Party’s Central Social Work Department underscores an intensified focus on Party leadership within the social sphere, extending “Party-building” efforts in private enterprises and social organizations. This top-down control risks hollowing out grassroots initiatives—a phenomenon reminiscent of the early days of the People’s Republic of China. As social groups weaken, information control tightens.

For example, regarding disaster information, “official media” have become the only channel allowed, with journalists compelled to adhere strictly to the official line. Disaster communications have become a tool for “stability maintenance.” Surprisingly, even central media outlets such as CCTV - authorized to disseminate official information - faced censorship this year. For instance, on 13 March there was an explosion in Yanjiao, Hebei, causing seven deaths. As CCTV reported live from the site, two men in black obstructed the camera, disrupting the broadcast. The program host in the studio was at a loss as to how to react. Another video uploaded online showed journalists with “China Media Group” logos on their clothing being pushed around by dozens of people on the scene. The China Journalists Association (CJA) responded with a statement, defending journalists’ right to conduct on-the-ground reporting, arguing that official written press releases should not preclude live reporting. Tragicomically, many people, including other journalists, made fun of the situation online – both what the CCTV journalists went through and the CJA statement – the thrust of their barbs being that such incidents were commonplace for other journalists; however, the CJA only cared when it ended up happening to central government media like CCTV.

Official press releases, unburdened by public opinion, often adopt a lofty tone while sidestepping critical issues and showing an alarming disregard for human life. Consider the tragic incident in January 2024 when a landslide buried 18 households in Zhenxiong County. The Yunnan provincial government website reported under the headline, “After 86 hours of search and rescue, all missing persons from the Zhenxiong landslide have been found,” However, the grim reality emerged when the text went on to claim that “we have retrieved 44 missing people, none of whom showed signs of life.” There was also no response to allegations previously raised online that the landslide may have been caused by excessive mining activity.  

In the aftermath of an incident or disaster, internet censorship departments often request Internet media to implement algorithms to artificially suppress news visibility. Keywords are blocked, social media influence ratings are lowered, and the flow of information narrows. As a result, transparency wanes, private relief efforts receive less attention, and the search and rescue system suffers. Victims fade into invisibility, and nuanced discussions about accountability, reconstruction, and the struggles faced by disaster zone residents become scarce.  

Moreover, the revised Law on Guarding State Secrets, effective since May 1, 2024, mandates under Article 42 that “confidentiality provisions must be observed in the public release of information by entities and organizations, as well as in the procurement of works, goods, and services involving state secrets.” This provision has significant implications for NGOs: are precipitation, hydrological, and earthquake data considered confidential information? In July 2023, the Wuhan Emergency Management Bureau announced that the Wuhan Earthquake Monitoring Centre had been hacked by a foreign organization, and a backdoor program had been installed that could “steal earthquake intensity data collected via rapid reporting by front-end seismological stations.” Seismological data is globally recognized as needing to be made public. Will there be justifications for classifying it as a “secret” in the future?

Natural Disasters and Public Incidents in the First Half of 2024 (Based on Incomplete Data) Natural Disasters and Public Incidents in the First Half of 2024 (Based on Incomplete Data) Henan Jiangsu Jiangxi Anhui Hubei Hebei Ningxia Shanxi Fujian Hainan Guangdong Yunnan Xinjiang 23 May Xiaochang County, stabbing attack, 8 dead 18 Feb. Nantong city, aluminium plant explosion, 5 dead, 13 injured 23 Feb. Nanjing, residential compound fire, 15 died, 44 injured 24 Jan. Xinyu city, shop fire, 39 deaths, 9 injured. 31 Mar. Nanchang and other parts of Jiangxi, gale force winds and hail, 7 dead 11 Mar. Gas explosion, Xieqiao Coal Mine, 7 dead. 13 Mar. Yanjiao City, Explosion, 7 dead, 27 injured 13 Apr. Qinhuangdao city, ship sinking, 12 dead. 9 May Qingtongxia city, traffic accident, 9 dead, 2 injured 11 Mar. Coal mine accident, Zhongyang county, 7 dead 19 Mar. G57 Hohhot-Beihai Expressway, traffic accident, 14 dead, 37 injured 4 Feb. Quanzhou city, traffic accident, 7 dead. 22 Jan. Zhaotong city, landslide, 47 missing 8 Apr. Ledong county, fishing boat sinking, 8 dead 23 Jan. 7.1 magnitude earthquake, Aksu city, 3 dead 4 injured  27 Apr. Guangzhou, tornado, 5 dead, 33 injured 1 May Meizhou-Dabu Expressway, road collapse, 48 dead 12 Jan. Pingdingshan city,19 Jan. school fire in Nanyang city, 13 children dead, 4 injured. 17 Jun. Pingdingshan, workers carried in refrigerated truck, 8 dead mining disaster, 16 dead  Illustrated for Echowall by Liang Shixin

In conclusion, the focus on ordinary citizens as the primary face of disasters in the public sphere, as well as the enthusiasm for post-disaster humanitarian action by non-state actors, are both fading from Chinese society; this is particularly concerning given China's high susceptibility to natural disasters. In recent years, extreme weather events caused by climate change, such as severe flooding, droughts, and heat waves, have swept across the country. Moreover, the rapid economic growth over the past few decades has exacerbated social issues, leading to frequent emergencies. The question is whether history will repeat itself, or if there is hope for a U-shaped improvement—a resurgence of compassion and human-centered approaches similar to the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake—in China's disaster management.

Author
He Man

He Man is an independent analyst with expertise in the Chinese internet sector and media.

July 22, 2024